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In recent years securities markets have become increasingly interconnected,
and securities fraud frequently crosses borders. The United States' well-
developed private enforcement mechanism for securities fraud is very
attractive to investors around the world who are harmed by transnational
securities fraud. However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, in overturning nearly fifty years offederal court
jurisprudence, severely limits the ability of investors to rely on the U.S.
securities laws to protect them when the relevant fraud has a significant
overseas component. Replacing the Second Circuit 's long-standing conduct
and effects tests for determining the extraterritorial reach of the securities
laws, the Supreme Court articulated a new transactional test for when the
laws apply. This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion and its
implications for the regulation of transnational securities fraud It also
examines certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act which attempted to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision as it applies to securities fraud
enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the Morrison decision significantly
curtails the extraterritorial application of the securities laws, which may
harm investor confidence, at least in the short term. However, it also has
the potential to encourage greater international cooperation in regulating
transnational securities fraud, as well as catalyzing regulatory reform in
other countries.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IN TRODUCTION ................................................................................ 538
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
ANTIFRAUD RULES PRIOR TO MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA
B AN K .............................................................................................. 540
A . The Effects Test ...................................................................... 542
B . The Conduct Test .................................................................... 543
* Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; J.D., New York
University School of Law; B.A., Northwestern University. The author would like to
thank: various faculty members at Texas Tech University School of Law for listening to
and providing feedback on "half-baked" research ideas; Professor Linda Silberman of
NYU School of Law for my early education in extraterritorial application of U.S. law and
for sparking my interest in the area; Thomas Vita and Michael Dunn of Norton Rose LLP
in London for my initial education in American Depositary Receipt programs.
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
C. Application of Section I 0(b) in Foreign-Cubed Cases .......... 544
D . A Procedural N ote ................................................................. 546
III. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK ...................................... 547
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank in the Lower Courts .... 547
B. The Supreme Court Opinion .................................................. 550
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION FOR REGULATION
OF TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD ........................................ 553
A. Uncertainty, Jurisdictional Conflict, and International
C oop eration ............................................................................ 554
B. The Supreme Court Embraces a Transaction-Based Test ..... 558
C. Implications of the Court 's Opinion on Specific Constituencies:
Dual- and Cross-Listed Companies and U.S. Investors
Purchasing Shares in Foreign Companies ............................. 562
V. CONGRESSIONAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO MORRIsON .... 570
A . The D odd-Frank Act .............................................................. 570
B. Possible Securities and Exchange Commission Responses to
Morrison v. National Australia Bank ..................................... 572
V I. C ON CLU SION ................................................................................. 573
I. INTRODUCTION
"This appeal requires us to revisit the vexing question of the
extraterritorial application of the securities laws, Rule 1Ob-5 in particular."'
So wrote Judge Parker of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the opening
lines of that court's 2008 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.
So vexing was the question to courts that the Supreme Court, after granting
certiorari in the Morrison case, decided to preempt it altogether. Setting aside
nearly fifty years of federal court jurisprudence, the Supreme Court opinion
in Morrison announces a new "transactional test" for courts to use in
determining whether the U.S. securities laws apply to a particular claim.2
Morrison v. National Australia Bank was the first time the Supreme
Court addressed the question of so-called "foreign cubed' 3 securities fraud
cases, and in fact was the Court's first decision regarding the extraterritorial
I Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
3 The term "foreign cubed" is generally credited to Stuart M. Grant and Diane Zilka,
who apparently coined the term in their article, The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal
Securities Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
NUMBER B-1442 93, 96 (Practising L. Inst. ed., 2004).
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reach of the securities laws. Foreign-cubed cases, brought by foreign
plaintiffs against a foreign company in relation to securities purchased
abroad, for years have tested the outer limits of the extraterritorial reach of
the securities laws, and of the far-reaching prohibition on securities fraud
contained in Rule 1Ob-5. At first blush, these cases are predicated on
transactions having little to do with the United States, and it seems hardly
surprising that courts would decline to apply U.S. law to them. However,
lower courts had previously applied U.S. law to the claims of foreign
plaintiffs in a few of these cases, when significant conduct that made up a
broader cross-border securities fraud took place in the United States. 4 Given
the increasing integration of world financial markets, and the attendant
escalation of transnational securities fraud, such cases have become
increasingly common in recent years. 5
Delineating the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) has been a
challenge to courts for years. The Supreme Court's attempt to draw a clear
boundary has far-reaching consequences for the regulation of transnational
securities fraud in today's interconnected global financial markets. While the
opinion of the Court at first glance appears to announce a revolutionary new
transactional test for application of Section 10(b),6 a closer look at the
decision reveals that the Court's opinion is fraught with drafting problems
that leave open questions about how the holding will be applied by district
courts in future cases. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law just a
month after the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison, contains an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that seems intended to
undo the Court's opinion in Morrison, at least as far as actions brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in transnational securities fraud cases.
7
4 See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 11), No. 02 Civ.
5571(RJH), 2004 WL 2375830 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004).
5 See, e.g., Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4-
5, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583-cv)
[hereinafter SEC Brief] (citing cases); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2008 SECURITIES
LITIGATION STUDY 43 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter 2008 STUDY], available at
http://l 0b5.pwc.con/PDF/NY-09-
0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF.
6 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 929P(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. For lawsuits
brought by private plaintiffs, the Dodd-Frank Act leaves the Supreme Court opinion in
Morrison untouched. See id. However, there is a possibility that Congress will revisit
this, because the Dodd-Frank Act also directs the Securities and Exchange Commission
to commission a study investigating the wisdom of a further amendment to the Exchange
Act that would also apply to claims by private plaintiffs. Id. § 929Y.
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However, Congress's amendment as drafted may be ineffective, due to a
procedural aspect of the Supreme Court's holding in Morrison.8 Thus,
questions remain in this area of the law. How district courts interpret both the
Supreme Court's opinion in the case, as well as the relevant provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, will have important impacts on a number of major
securities fraud cases currently going forward in U.S. courts, including
litigation against British Petroleum. A careful analysis of the decision and the
relevant policy considerations is therefore warranted, particularly at a time
when the global economy remains unsettled and litigation of transnational
securities fraud is prevalent in U.S. courts.9
Part II of this Article provides a background on extraterritorial
application of the securities laws, focusing on the Second Circuit's
jurisprudence in the area. Part III turns to the Morrison v. National Australia
Bank case, and includes discussion of both the Second Circuit's and the
Supreme Court's opinions in the case. Part IV addresses the implications of
the Supreme Court's holding in Morrison. Part V discusses the Dodd-Frank
Act provisions on extraterritorial application of the securities laws, and also
raises the possibility of future Congressional and/or Securities and Exchange
Commission action on the issue. Part VI concludes that, though the Supreme
Court opinion provides some long-desired certainty about the extraterritorial
application of the securities antifraud rules, it does so at the cost of making
the private cause of action unavailable in most securities fraud cases with a
significant overseas component, potentially harming investor confidence in
the globalized financial markets.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
ANTIFRAUD RULES PRIOR TO MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
The majority of transnational securities fraud cases that find their way
into U.S. courts are premised on Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193410 (the Exchange Act) and its accompanying Rule 1Ob-5." l The
8 See infra Part V.A.
9 In a recent study, securities fraud class actions against foreign issuers represented
fourteen percent of total securities class actions filed in the U.S. in 2009, and seventeen
percent of the total in 2008. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 SECURITIEs LITIGATION
STUDY 35 (Apr. 2010), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-10-
0559%20SEC%20LIT/o2OSTUDY V7%20PRINT.PDF. In addition, other securities
class actions brought in U.S. courts are premised on transnational securities frauds
perpetrated by U.S. companies.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
I1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). The securities regulatory regime seeks to prevent
and punish fraud via numerous provisions in both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
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Supreme Court has characterized Section 10(b) as a "catchall. ' 12 It is a broad
stroke rule intended to provide the SEC with a flexible tool "to deal with new
manipulative [or cunning] devices."' 13 It is also not explicitly restricted to
fraud in connection with sales or transactions on U.S. markets, but rather
applies to the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered."'14 Courts, in
interpreting the language and legislative history of Section 10(b), early on
determined that "Congress thus meant § 10(b) to protect against fraud in the
sale or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized
United States markets."' 15
In 1942, the SEC used its rule-making authority under Section 10(b) to
promulgate Rule 1Ob-5. In adopting the rule, the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued a press release stating: "The new rule closes a loophole
in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." 16 The language of the rule 17 is unquestionably far-
reaching, but it is also vague, the details of its application and scope left
Exchange Act. However, the most far-reaching of these provisions is Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and its accompanying Rule lOb-5, which are the focus of the case law
discussed in this Article.
12 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
15 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir.
1972).
16 Rule 10b-5, Exchange Act Release No. 3,230, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (May 21,
1942).
17 Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
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almost exclusively to the courts to determine, generating extensive judicial
discussion. 18
Beginning in the 1960s, courts developed two tests for determining the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the antifraud rules,
which became commonly referred to as the "conduct" and "effects" tests.
Because of its location at the center of the financial markets, the Second
Circuit has been the most influential court in terms of the development of
jurisprudence in this area, though other courts have sometimes deviated a bit
from the Second Circuit's approach. 19 First, conduct abroad giving rise to
losses in the United States, or harm to the U.S. markets, can give rise to
extraterritorial application of the securities laws (the "effects" test). Second,
extraterritorial application may exist in certain instances when conduct in the
United States causes losses abroad (the "conduct" test). Courts also
sometimes applied the two tests together, if possible. 20
A. The Effects Test
The effects test focuses on whether U.S. investors or markets were
harmed by the alleged fraud. This would typically be the case, for example,
where a foreign company's stock trades on a U.S. market. 21 The effects test
was first articulated in 1968 in the seminal case Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.22
In that case, an antifraud action was brought by an American shareholder of a
Canadian corporation, Banff Oil Ltd., alleging damages as a result of sales in
Canada of the corporation's stock to certain of its controlling shareholders,
18 See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
936 (5th ed. 2003) (noting that "it is difficult to think of another instance in the entire
corpus juris in which the interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking, and
judicial processes has produced so much from so little," and quoting Chief Justice
Rehnquist who has called 10b-5 a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn" (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975))).
19 See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1799,
1812 (1992). Other circuits have developed tests based on the Second Circuit approach,
with some variation in the language of the tests. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Austl.)
PTY. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109, 116 (3rd Cir. 1977).
20 See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995).
21 This was so in the first case to articulate the effects test, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
22 See id. at 206.
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also foreign, at an unfairly low price.23 Though the fraudulent transaction
took place entirely abroad, the court found that the usual presumption against
extraterritoriality did not apply, at least when the fraudulent transactions
involved stock traded on a U.S. exchange.24 (Banff Oil's stock traded on the
American Stock Exchange as well as the Toronto Stock Exchange.)25
The key limitation to the effects test is that courts do not consider foreign
conduct with only generalized effects in the United States to be sufficient.26
In other words, foreign conduct that affects general confidence in the
securities markets would not give rise to a claim under Section 10(b). Rather,
courts require a showing of harm to specific interests within the United
States, for example, claims by U.S. investors who can assert specific
monetary losses as a result of the foreign conduct. 27
B. The Conduct Test
The conduct test looks at whether some conduct that was material to the
fraud directly caused the harm in question, regardless of the location of the
investors or the markets where the stock was sold.28 This test, while more
soundly rooted in the traditional jurisdictional basis of territoriality than the
effects test,29 has also proved more difficult to apply than the effects test, and
ultimately more controversial. The main difficulty is determining what level
of conduct in the U.S. is sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act. Securities transactions can be made up of many moving parts that often
cross territorial boundaries, and fraudulent acts can occur in more than one
place.30 It is not disputed that under customary international law, concurrent
jurisdiction over securities fraud cases is contemplated in some instances. 31
2 3 Id. at 204.
24 Id. at 206.
25 Id. at 204.
26 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 22 (2007).
27 See id. at 22-23 (citing Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425,
430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
28 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (asserting that U.S.
securities laws apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United
States only when acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly caused
such losses).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(l)(a) (1987).
30 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 207, 216-17 (1996).
31 P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests",
41 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 245, 253 (1992).
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The problem is that this can sometimes lead to instances of jurisdictional
conflict, where the applicable policies and rules of the interested countries
are in conflict, and to possible overregulation. Too broad an extraterritorial
application of the securities antifraud rules may amount to an impermissible
interference with foreign securities markets.32
The Second Circuit addressed this question in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc.,33 asserting that the U.S. securities laws only apply to losses
from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States when acts or
culpable failures to act directly caused such losses.34 Lesser thresholds of
conduct would be necessary when conduct causes losses in the United States
(no U.S. conduct is necessary), or to Americans residing abroad. (Acts or
omissions in the United States must have "significantly contributed" to such
losses.)35 The Bersch standard relating to conduct causing losses to
foreigners has been further refined over time to hold that subject matter
jurisdiction exists over securities claims if "activities in [the United States]
were more than merely preparatory to a fraud and culpable acts or omissions
occurring here directly caused losses to investors abroad. ' 36 Of course, this
left a number of open questions, including what acts will be considered
"merely preparatory" and what constitutes "directly caused"; lower courts
continued to struggle with these questions, and the Second Circuit provided
little guidance. Until the Supreme Court decision in Morrison, the Supreme
Court had never addressed the issue.
C. Application of Section 10(b) in Foreign-Cubed Cases
In recent years, district courts have increasingly been faced with cases
implicating the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws, and of Section 10(b) in particular.37 This is not
surprising in light of the globalization of the world's financial markets, and
the increasing incidence of cross-listing, dual-listing, and other cross-border
capital raising efforts. With the increasing incidence of transnational
32 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) ("We know of
no one who thought that the Act was intended to 'regulat[e]' foreign securities
exchanges--or indeed who even believed that under established principles of
international law Congress had the power to do so.").
33 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
34 Id. at 993.
35 Id.
36 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).
37 Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 16-17.
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securities fraud, investors have become more proactive in seeking redress.38
Often this leads them to the United States, with its well-developed class
action mechanism in securities fraud cases.39 A particular challenge has
been presented to the courts in the form of the increasing incidence of
foreign-cubed cases.40 Such cases test the outer limits of the extraterritorial
application of the U.S. antifraud rules on the basis of the conduct test,41 and
also highlight the problems with the conduct test.
A number of recent district court decisions have applied Section 10(b) to
the claims of foreign-cubed plaintiffs. For example, In re Gaming Lottery
Securities Litigation42 involved claims by both U.S. and foreign plaintiffs
against a Canadian corporation for fraud in connection with the sale of
securities on both American and Canadian exchanges.43 The relevant U.S.
conduct included the acquisition of a Washington corporation, which the
defendant company proceeded to operate without receiving regulatory
approval from Washington state gaming regulators for operations.44 In
addition, the company reported increases in earnings and stockholder equity
based on the acquired entity's financials, even though they knew they would
not be able to obtain regulatory approval for the entity's operations, therefore
making the statements regarding the U.S. subsidiary's earnings misleading.45
There, the court certified both Canadians and U.S. investors as lead
plaintiffs, 46 finding that sufficient conduct had occurred in the United States
that was "more than merely preparatory" to the alleged fraud so as to confer
subject matter jurisdiction over the Canadians' claims as well as the domestic
plaintiffs' claims.47
38 Id.
39 See 2008 STUDY, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that securities class actions against
foreign issuers hit an all-time high in 2008).
40 Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 17.
41 To date, no courts have applied the antifraud rules in a foreign-cubed case on the
basis of the effects test. Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation
and Global Securities Class Actions, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 476 (2009).
42 58 F. Supp. 2d 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
43 Id. at 64-65.
44 Id. at 65-67.
45 Id.
46 The process of appointing a lead plaintiff in multinational securities class actions
often invokes the question of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud rules.
See Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 27-29.
47 In re Gaming Lottery, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74.
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Similarly, in In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation (Vivendi
i/),48 the issuing company's CEO and CFO moved to New York in order to
oversee a number of acquisitions of U.S. companies, and it was debt taken on
in connection with these acquisitions that was the focus of the allegedly false
and misleading statements at issue in the lawsuit.49 The U.S.-based conduct
was therefore the basis for the false statements, and was found to be "integral
and not merely preparatory to the alleged fraud upon foreign purchasers of
Vivendi shares on foreign exchanges." 50
In a third case brought around the same time as Vivendi, In re National
Australia Bank Securities Litigation, the district court declined to apply
Section 10(b) to the claims of the foreign plaintiffs in the case.5 1 However, it
was a "close call," 52 and the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, 53 which until then had never ruled on a foreign-cubed case.
Because of the uncertainty among district courts about how to apply the
conduct test to these cases, resulting in fragmentation and unpredictable
results,54 the Second Circuit opinion was widely anticipated, It also marked
the next step in a long odyssey for the parties in the case that would lead all
the way to the Supreme Court.
D. A Procedural Note
Until the Supreme Court decision in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, federal courts had always treated the question of extraterritorial
application of the securities antifraud provisions as a question of subject
48No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH), 2004 WL 2375830 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004). The
Vivendi litigation was ongoing at the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.
A jury verdict was issued on January 29, 2010, finding the company liable to investors.
Court Finds Vivendi Liable for Misleading Investors, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2010, at B3
[hereinafter Vivendi Liable], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/30vivendi.html?_r=l. However, following
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, a district court dismissed the claims of all
purchasers of Vivendi ordinary shares, and limited the case to claims of only certain
purchasers of Vivendi's American Depositary Receipts. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A.
Sec. Litig. (Vivendi III), No. 02 Civ. 05571(RJH)(HBJ), 2011 WL 590915, at *8, *12
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011); see also infra Part IV.C.
49 Vivendi 11, 2004 WL 2375830, at *1.
50 Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
51 In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at
*1, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
52 Id. at *8.
53 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2008).
54 See Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 24.
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matter jurisdiction. 55 However, this is somewhat of a misnomer as the real
question is one of jurisdiction to prescribe, 56 or rather, whether or not the
allegedly fraudulent acts fall within the ambit of the securities antifraud
rules. The Supreme Court in Morrison corrected this "threshold error" in the
Second Circuit's longstanding approach to questions of the extraterritorial
reach of Section 10(b). 57 The Supreme Court affirmed that the question was
one of merits, rather than an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which only
"refers to a tribunal's power to hear a case." 58 Jurisdiction over lawsuits
alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is conferred by Section
27 of the Exchange Act.59 The location of fraudulent conduct therefore does
not affect this conferral of jurisdiction. 60 It is only relevant as to whether or
not a particular fraudulent scheme or act violates Section 10(b). 61 The Court
acknowledged this, but did not find it necessary to remand in light of this
error, because "a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for
the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion." 62 The Supreme Court's opinion in
Morrison thus addressed whether the petitioners' allegations stated a claim
for relief under Section 10(b). 63
III. MORRISON v. NATIONAL A USTRALIA BANK
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank in the Lower Courts
Morrison v. National Australia Bank underscored the particular
difficulties raised by foreign-cubed cases, and reignited debate on the proper
scope of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws on the
basis of conduct. The impetus for the case was a series of write-downs made
by National Australia Bank (NAB) in 2001, due to the allegedly fraudulent
55 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 984-90 (2d Cir. 1975).
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (defining jurisdiction
to prescribe as the power of a country to "make its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things"); see also ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 55 n. 1, 102-03 (3d ed. 2006).
57 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010).
58 Id. at 2877 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
63 Id. This correction was not unexpected, as the Court had recently criticized
courts' "less than meticulous" treatment of the distinction between an element of a claim
for relief and a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
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overvaluation of one of NAB's American subsidiaries, a mortgage servicing
company based in Florida called HomeSide, Inc. The write-downs totaled
approximately A$4 billion,64 and constituted the largest single loss reported
in Australian corporate history up to that point.65 The bank's shares, trading
on the Australian Stock Exchange, as well as on exchanges in Tokyo, New
Zealand, London, and in the form of American Depositary Receipts on the
New York Stock Exchange, initially dropped between ten and thirteen
percent following the write-downs. 66
In response to these losses, a group of international shareholders of the
bank brought suit against NAB in U.S. federal court, claiming violations of
the securities antifraud rules, including Rule lOb-5. The plaintiffs alleged
that the overvaluation of HomeSide was the result of intentional misuse of
valuation models by certain of its employees and executives who "had been
cooking HomeSide's books since at least April 1999," in violation of the
U.S. securities laws.67 These misstatements of HomeSide's value were sent
to NAB headquarters in Australia and incorporated into NAB's own financial
statements, then disseminated to the public in regulatory filings and press
releases, including filings with the SEC made in connection with NAB's
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 68
Though calling the case a "close call," 69 the district court dismissed the
case, stating that "the transactions of which [the] plaintiffs complain [are]
fundamentally foreign in nature, and thus beyond the scope of this Court's
jurisdiction under the Exchange Act."'70 On appeal, the Second Circuit
64 "A$" denotes Australian dollars. According to statistics of the Reserve Bank of
Australia, the Australian dollar was worth approximately 0.53 U.S. dollars on September
3, 2001, the date of NAB's announcement of its second HomeSide-related write-down.
See Exchange Rate Data, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL.,
http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/hist-exchange-rates/1999-2002.xls (last visited Jan. 27,
2011).
65 Shann Turnbull, Men Behaving Badly in Banking: Revealing the Irrelevance of
Best Practices in Corporate Governance, in ANTHONY TARANTINO, GOVERNANCE, RISK
AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: TECHNOLOGY, FINANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES 82, 87 (2008), available at
http://media.wiley.com/productancillary/9X/04700958/DOWNLOAD/chapter73.pdf
(article appears at pages 82 through 95 of "URL Contents"--article title appears in book
but text is only available online).
66 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583-cv).
6 7 Id. at 21.
68 See id. at 36-37.
69 In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
70 Id. at *2.
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affirmed the district court's outcome. 71 However, the Second Circuit left
open the possibility that, on other facts, it would hear a foreign-cubed claim
by foreign plaintiffs. 72 Defendants had argued for a bright-line rule barring
foreign-cubed claims brought solely on the basis of conduct in the United
States, if there were no allegation of harm to domestic investors or markets. 73
The Second Circuit refused to adopt such a rule, because it could not
anticipate "all the circumstances in which the ingenuity of those inclined to
violate the securities laws should result in their being subject to American
jurisdiction." 74 Instead, the court determined that the conduct and effects
tests were the proper lens through which to examine the question of
extraterritoriality. 75 It went on to say that the issue before it in Morrison
"boils down to what conduct comprises the heart of the alleged fraud."'76 On
the facts of the case, though, the Second Circuit found that acts or omissions
in Australia were "more directly responsible" for the plaintiffs' injuries, and
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case. 77
Comparing the facts of Morrison v. National Australia Bank to the facts
of cases such as In re Gaming Lottery and Vivendi, it seems clear that
Morrison could easily have come out the other way;78 indeed, the judge in In
re Gaming Lottery might well have found for the plaintiffs in Morrison.
Though the Second Circuit claimed to be applying its "usual rules," 79 the
court struggled with the issue of whether conduct in the U.S. had "directly
caused" the harm abroad, and used novel language to find that acts or
omissions in Australia were "more directly responsible" for the plaintiffs'
injuries. 80 This "more directly" language had never appeared in any prior
case, making it seem like the court was straining to avoid exercising
jurisdiction in this case. Certainly, the court's decision to decline to hear the
case was perfectly reasonable in light of the significantly Australian aspects
of the case. At the same time, it would not have been "wrong" under the
conduct test to find that the plaintiffs had articulated a claim for relief under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
71 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
72 Id. at 175.
73 Id. at 174.
74 Id. at 175.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Morrison, 547 F.3d at 176.
78 See Choi & Silberman, supra note 41, at 492 ("Another court, analyzing the same
facts, might have decided the case differently ....
79 Morrison, 547 F.3d at 172.
80 1d. at 176 (emphasis added).
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B. The Supreme Court Opinion
Plaintiffs in Morrison shortly appealed to the Supreme Court, and the
Court granted certiorari on November 30, 2009.81 Because it would be the
first time the Supreme Court would address the issue of the extraterritorial
reach of the securities antifraud rules, the opinion was widely anticipated.
Issued on June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court's opinion in the case was
unanimous as to the judgment, which affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling.82
However, the majority's opinion went beyond a simple affirmation,
overruling nearly fifty years of federal court jurisprudence based on the
Second Circuit's conduct and effects tests and articulating a new test for
determining the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
From as early as March 2010, when the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in the case, the probable outcome was clear. In early questioning
of the petitioners' attorney, Justice Ginsburg observed, "I mean, this case is
Australian plaintiff, Australian defendant, shares purchased in Australia. It
has 'Australia' written all over it. '"83 When the Supreme Court's opinion was
issued a few months later, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, declared that
"Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed
on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other
security in the United States."84 Since all the aspects of the purchase
complained of by the plaintiffs in the case occurred outside the United States,
the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint.85
The Court's decision to set aside the conduct and effects tests relied
primarily on a textual argument. However, there was also a policy rationale
for the decision, which, though not heavily developed by the Court, was
81 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 783, 783 (2009).
82 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). Justice Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration of the case, see id, as she had sat on the Second Circuit
when that court heard the case. However, it can be assumed that she would have at least
concurred in the judgment, given how the Second Circuit decided the case. Justice Breyer
wrote a brief and narrow concurrence. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). He stated that the
purchased securities at issue in Morrison were not registered with the SEC, and the
purchases "took place entirely in Australia and involved only Australian investors." Id. In
light of the presumption against extraterritoriality, he did not believe that Section
10(b)(1) or (2) therefore reached plaintiffs' claims. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, wrote a more lengthy concurrence arguing for preservation of the Second
Circuit test. See id. at 2888-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191).
84 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
85 Id.
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extensively treated by commentators prior to the Court's decision in
Morrison.86 Predictably, Justice Scalia's discussion of the law began with a
reference to the presumption against extraterritoriality 87 that the Supreme
Court first articulated in the American Banana case.88 This principle, as
restated by Justice Scalia, is a canon of construction that directs courts to
assume that Congress did not intend a law to have extraterritorial effect
unless such intent is clearly expressed in the statute. 89 On the basis of this
principle, Justice Scalia proceeded to sharply criticize over forty years of
Second Circuit and other federal court jurisprudence, which he viewed as
disregarding the presumption against extraterritoriality.9" After describing
the conduct and effects tests, he observed, "The Second Circuit never put
forward a textual or even extratextual basis for these tests." 91
Justice Scalia then asserted a number of arguments based on the text of
the Exchange Act in support of the Court's decision to set aside the Second
Circuit's tests. To begin, the Court asserted that it would apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality in all cases, "[r]ather than guess anew"
at what Congress would have wanted had it thought about the situation
before.92 Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court addressed three arguments made by
petitioners in the case, as well as by the Solicitor General writing for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be overcome. First, Section 10(b) refers to interstate
commerce, which includes "trade, commerce, transportation, or
communication ... between any foreign country and any State ... -93
However, relying on past precedent, the Court asserted that this general
reference to foreign commerce, without more, does not defeat the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 94
86 See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 30, at 219-39; Choi & Silberman, supra
note 41, at 480-88.
87 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
88 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1909).
89 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)).
90 Id. at 2878-79 ("With Schoenbaum and Leasco on the books, the Second Circuit
had excised the presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of
§ 10(b) .... ).
91 Id. at 2879.
9 2 ld. at 2881.
93 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2006).
94 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 251).
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The second textual argument made by the petitioners and rebutted by the
Court was a reference to Congress's description of the purposes of the
Exchange Act, which included the observation that "'prices established and
offered in [securities] transactions are generally disseminated and quoted
throughout the United States and foreign countries."'95 Again, though, the
Court found this unpersuasive: "The antecedent of 'such transactions' .. . is
found in the first sentence of the section, which declares that 'transactions in
securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-
counter markets are affected with a national public interest. '96 Justice Scalia
was dismissive of the idea that such "national public interest" could pertain
to "transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets." 97
Petitioners' final textual argument, intended to support their contention
that Section 10(b) applies extraterritorially, relied on Section 30(b) of the
Exchange Act. This section provides: "The provisions of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States," unless he does so in violation of regulations promulgated by the
Commission "to prevent the evasion of this chapter." 98 The Solicitor General
argued that if the Exchange Act did not apply extraterritorially, this provision
would have no relevance. 99 The Court disagreed, stating that "it would be
odd for Congress to indicate the extraterritorial application of the whole
Exchange Act by means of a provision imposing a condition precedent to its
application abroad." 100 Instead, the Court believed the provision was
"directed at actions abroad that might conceal a domestic violation, or might
cause what would otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a
technicality."10' While the Court did not find the Section 30(b) argument
persuasive enough to override the presumption against extraterritoriality, 10 2
this observation does perhaps encourage the Commission to promulgate
regulations under Section 30 that were heretofore perceived as unnecessary
because of the broad reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.1 03
95 Brief for Petitioners at 39, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2006)).
96 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006)).
97 Id.
98 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006).
99 Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14,
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191).
100 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882.
101 Id. at 2882-83.
102 Id.
103 See infra Part V.B.
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Finally, the Supreme Court addressed petitioners' argument that the
Morrison case did not require extraterritorial application because of the
significant domestic conduct that had occurred. Here the Court moved away
from its purely textual and precedent-based argument to adopt the new
transaction-based rule it articulated for when Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
could apply. While acknowledging that "it is a rare case of prohibited
extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the
United States," the Court asserted that "the focus of the Exchange Act is not
upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales
of securities in the United States." 104 In justifying this assertion, the Court
pointed to the "in connection with" clause of Section 10(b), stating that the
"purchase-and-sale transactions" referred to there "are the objects of the
statute's solicitude."' 105 Because the purchase-and-sale transactions in
Morrison occurred outside the United States, and the case involved "no
securities listed on a domestic exchange," the petitioners had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 106
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION FOR REGULATION
OF TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD
Though the Supreme Court's decision was primarily based on the text of
the statute, the Court hinted at a number of important policy issues
underlying the holding, examination of which will illuminate the significant
impact this decision could have on regulation of the securities markets. First,
as the Supreme Court opinion pointed out in a harsh criticism of the Second
Circuit's traditional tests, the tests have proven incredibly difficult to
administer. 10 7 Commentators have been making this same criticism of the
tests for years.' 0 8 This has led to uncertainty for the relevant actors as courts
have applied the tests on a case-by-case basis, sometimes resulting in
divergent outcomes in cases with substantially similar factual scenarios. 10 9
Such uncertainty may be particularly costly in an area of the law that bears
directly upon economic and business interests. Second, the extraterritorial
application of the securities laws has sometimes led to jurisdictional conflicts
with other countries that also seek to apply their regulations to a particular
104 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2888.
107 Id. at 2879 ("As they developed, these tests were not easy to administer.").
108 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 24-25.
109 See Choi & Silberman, supra note 41, at 473 n.38.
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transaction. 1 0 Third, the decision could have a very real impact on investors,
raising questions about the proper level of regulatory intensity,"' l the
advisability or necessity of private rights of action for antifraud enforcement,
and how to strike a balance between under- and over-regulation of securities
transactions in a globalized world. The Supreme Court's opinion expresses
an underlying skepticism about the value of the private right of action in
deterring and punishing securities fraud, but also evinces a disregard for the
interconnectedness of the world financial markets. In addition, the Court's
new transactional test carries particular implications for specific groups of
actors who engage in cross-border securities transactions. This section of the
Article will address each of these issues in turn.
A. Uncertainty, Jurisdictional Conflict, and International Cooperation
First, it is unquestionable that the Second Circuit's approach created
uncertainty for issuers regarding potential liability under the U.S. antifraud
rules.112 Many felt this had a chilling effect on valuable economic activity in
the United States, as foreign companies would limit their business within the
United States in order to avoid the risk of having to defend against costly
litigation in U.S. courts.11 3 For example, if the Morrison case had come out
the other way, this could potentially have discouraged foreign companies
from investing in U.S. subsidiaries. Furthermore, as multiple countries can
often claim a legitimate regulatory interest in regulating the same conduct,
the cost of multiple regulations becomes burdensome to business. In some
cases, concurrent jurisdiction is not a problem, but when multiple countries
are able to assert their regulatory jurisdiction over conduct because of effects
on their citizens, and one or more other countries are also able to apply their
laws and regulations because of conduct within their borders, the cost of
compliance with all these rules can become prohibitive. It is also becoming
increasingly costly for regulators and judicial systems to enforce the law, as
more and more transactions can implicate a country's regulatory system on
110 Id. at 60-64.
1 See generally Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial
Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253
(2007).
112 See Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 67.
113 See generally COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION (2006), available at
http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l 1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (discussing the
burden of uncertainty in Rule lob-5 litigation on issuers).
[Vol. 72:3
EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
the basis of tenuous contacts with that country, which may undermine the
overall effectiveness of regulation.114
Besides the negative impact that this uncertainty and overlapping
regulation had on businesses, it also led to diplomatic controversies, as
foreign governments saw their interests impinged upon. 115 A number of
important constituencies submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court
supporting their view that extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities
laws under the old conduct and effects tests constituted regulatory
overreaching. Australia, the United Kingdom, and France all submitted
amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, urging affirmance of the Second
Circuit's decision in the case, and also advocating a limit on the application
of Section 10(b) to foreign-cubed cases. 116 The United Kingdom, for
example, urged in its amicus brief:
Although there is no U.K. party in this case, the broad assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by United States courts implicates the legitimate
sovereign interests and policy choices of the United Kingdom. The risk of
infringing upon the sovereignty of other nations is a particular concern with
respect to the regulation of securities transactions, especially in cases
involving foreign purchasers, a foreign issuer, and alleged harm suffered in
transactions on a foreign securities exchange (so-called "foreign-cubed"
securities cases). 117
Echoes of these same concerns have long been asserted by courts and
commentators in favor of a limited extraterritorial application of the
securities laws. 118 Too broad an extraterritorial application of the U.S.
antifraud rules can result in jurisdictional conflict with other countries
seeking to regulate the same transaction. Each country with a developed
market for securities has made legislative choices regarding how to regulate
securities fraud. For example, the laws in many countries do not (or did not
114 This is particularly poignant in the United States in the context of the foreign-
cubed cases, where tenuous links to the United States lead to often-costly litigation in
U.S. courts.
115 See, e.g., Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Defendants-Appellees at 2, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130
S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
116 See id. at 28, 38; Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 4-5, 34, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191); Brief of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2, 29, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter U.K. Brief].
117 U.K. Brief, supra note 116, at 2.
118 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 60-64.
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until very recently) permit class actions in the securities law context.119
Broad extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud rules can interfere
with these legislative choices. 120 In addition, when multiple countries seek to
regulate the same conduct, this can create a situation where investors will
forum-shop to find the most favorable forum in which to bring their suit. In
that case, countries that have made the regulatory judgment not to allow
private enforcement of their antifraud rules, for example, could therefore
have their legislative judgment thwarted.12
While the foregoing arguments clearly support the Supreme Court's
decision, some U.K.-based commentators have characterized the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison as a "major step back for UK investors" and
other investors around the world. 122 While the U.K. government in its amicus
brief argued that U.K. institutions could readily bring securities fraud claims
in the U.K., 123 that may not be "an accurate picture."'1 24 Of course, just
because the United States legal system may be more shareholder-friendly in
its substance and in the procedural mechanism for shareholder class action
suits, this does not mean that the U.S. courts should be able to police the
world for securities fraud. 125 However, recent shareholder activism in other
countries has shed light on the fact that other systems may require reform to
effectively regulate securities fraud, and there is an argument to be made that
some shareholder activism in other countries, such as the U.K., may have
been "developing on the back of claims in the US."'1 26 Therefore, in the
interest of ensuring the integrity of the world's financial markets and
effective regulation of securities fraud, the Second Circuit's traditional tests
l19 See id. at 61.
120 U.K. Brief, supra note 116, at 15-16; see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885-86.
121 Joshua G. Urquhart, Comment, Transnational Securities Fraud Regulation:
Problems and Solutions, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 474 (2000).
122 David Greene, The US Ruling on Morrison v NAB Deals a Blow to the
International Claims Culture, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/J0un/28/supreme-court-morrison-national-australia-
bank.
123 See U.K. Brief, supra note 116, at 8-10.
124 Greene, supra note 122.
125 Nor is it settled that the U.S.-style class action is the best method of policing
securities fraud. This is an important debate, but elaboration of it is beyond the scope of
this Article. The issue has been treated carefully elsewhere. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008).
126 Greene, supra note 122.
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may have served an important role in preventing much fraud from slipping
through the cracks in the global financial regulatory system.
The Supreme Court's decision thus may be a setback for foreign
shareholders, at a time when shareholder confidence is already on shaky
ground in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. At the same time, it could be
the galvanizing agent for a push to reform other countries' systems to
become more shareholder-friendly. With more limited access to U.S. class
actions, investors and other shareholders' interest groups in other countries
may put increased pressure on their own governments to improve their
domestic antifraud regulation. In fact, even before the Court's decision in
Morrison, the benefits of the class action mechanism were beginning to be
recognized in other countries. A number of countries have recently adopted a
form of collective-action lawsuit, or otherwise modified their laws to ease the
way for private enforcement of securities fraud claims, including Australia,
parts of Europe, and China.127
Another possible side effect of the Supreme Court's decision could be its
impact on the potential for a multilateral negotiated solution. 128 As noted in a
recent report by the International Bar Association (IBA), "There is a
profound consensus among regulators, academics, financial institutions and
others that the regulatory framework of the international financial markets
needs to undergo a fundamental change to address the diminished influence
of national and regional securities regulators over cross-border financial
activities."' 129 This consensus applies to all areas of financial regulation. 130
127 See, e.g., Xi Chao, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing
Lianyi Co v ZHONG Weida and Others (2004) Heilongiiang High Court, 1 J. COMP. L.
492, 493 (2006); Olivier Cavdzian et al., Class Actions in Europe: Reality or Myth? The
Example of France, JONES DAY 9-12 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ff7fd833-8640-443c-bb46-
d6e756864345/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6e6OfO0f-Od2a-4cOc-b986-
d7982522clf6/Class%2OActions%202009.pdf; Jonathan Redwood, Limitations of US.
Securities Litigation Against Australian Companies by Australian Plaintiffs, LIST A
BARRISTERS 1, 5-6 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.barristers.com.au/www/392/1001127/displayarticle/recent-publications--
1001461.html.
128 There is some consensus among scholars that international cooperation would be
the optimal approach to the problem. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 68; Andrew
T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEo. L.J. 883, 935 (2002). However,
there is little if any agreement as to the form that a multilateral solution should take. I
have treated this subject more fully elsewhere. See Genevieve Beyea, Transnational
Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial Application of US. Securities Laws: Challenges
and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2011).
129 INT'L BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 273 (2009), http://tinyurl.com/taskforce-etj-pdf.
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However, it is particularly prescient in the context of deterring and punishing
securities fraud, which is necessary to maintain stability and prosperity in the
capital markets. Transnational securities fraud provides an ideal backdrop for
international cooperation. First of all, the problems caused by securities
fraud-lack of investor confidence, reduced liquidity in the markets, and
depressed prices-are no longer contained to one country or region but will
affect capital markets throughout the world.' 3 ' Furthermore, most countries
with securities markets have regulations aimed at discouraging financial
fraud. 132 While the prohibitions on fraud vary in form, in substance they all
aim to eradicate essentially the same behavior. 133 Similarly, all countries
with active securities markets have an interest in reducing the inefficiencies
created by overregulation and jurisdictional conflict. In the wake of the
recent financial crisis, there is an even greater consensus among countries
that cooperation and reform are needed in the area of financial regulation.134
Because the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison has the potential to leave
significant groups of shareholders without an adequate remedy when harmed
by transnational securities fraud, it may spur a recognition of the urgent need
for greater global cooperation on the issue.
B. The Supreme Court Embraces a Transaction-Based Test
The foregoing policy considerations underlying the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison all raise the issue of the optimal level of antifraud
regulation in transnational securities transactions. The Court's opinion seems
130 See id
131 TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, INT'L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM'NS, STRENGTHENING CAPITAL MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD ii (Feb.
2005), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD192.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO
REPORT]; see also Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, The Challenge of Enforcement in
Securities Markets: Mission Impossible? 6-11 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
09/168, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1457591 &rec= 1 &srcabs= 1428899.
132 INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS ET AL., MANAGING THE BUSINESS RISK OF FRAUD:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE 11 (2008), http://www.acfe.com/documents/managing-business-
risk.pdf.
133 For example, compare Rule lob-5 with other antifraud regulations: Council
Directive 2003/6, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 20 (EC) (European Community regulation), and
Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974 § 52. See also Sanzhu Zhu, Civil Litigation
Arising from False Statements on China's Securities Market, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 377, 378-79 (2005).
134 This has been a major topic of discussion among world leaders at the Group of
20 talks. Matt Spetalnick, Financial Regulation Rises to Top of G20 Agenda, REUTERS
(Sept. 19, 2009, 3:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58G34Z20090919.
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to embrace a view expressed by scholars in recent years who support an
exchange-based choice-of-law rule for securities fraud class action suits.
Such commentators urge the creation of a rule under which foreign investors
transacting on a non-U.S. exchange would be barred from bringing a 1Ob-5
claim in U.S. courts against the issuer. 135 This approach takes the view that
governments should only be concerned about regulating conduct that has
effects on persons within their jurisdictions. 136 Advocates of this rule focus
on the effects of an alleged fraud, and assert that the conduct test, which is
the basis of foreign-cubed claims, is not relevant because it has no bearing on
the impact of behavior on welfare. 137 The best way to maximize global
welfare, on this view, is to rely on the market to select the optimal level of
regulation. 138
This exchange-based rule, which is close to the test articulated by Justice
Scalia in the Court's opinion, 139 would provide a number of benefits. First, it
would provide issuers with valuable certainty as to the applicable law and
reduce the incidence of jurisdictional conflict with other regulators. Such
certainty would theoretically reduce the costs associated with offering
securities and therefore allow the securities to be sold at a better price to
investors. 140 Second, this approach would theoretically lead to a socially
135 See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 30, at 240-41; Guzman, supra note 128, at
906-07.
136 See Guzman, supra note 128, at 894.
137 Id. at 921.
138 See id. at 921-25.
139 While Justice Scalia clearly embraced the policy argument of commentators such
as Professor Guzman, it is not entirely clear from the wording of the test if a strict
transactional test is in fact the rule adopted by the Supreme Court. See Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010); see also infra notes 156-67 and
accompanying text. However, most courts and commentators have thus far interpreted the
Morrison holding to impose a strict transaction-based test. See, e.g., In re Soci&6t
Gdnrrale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2010).
140 No empirical proof of this theory is readily available. Furthermore, it is not clear
to what extent the lurking threat of lOb-5 liability adds to the cost of securities for
shareholders (in fact it may reduce it, if shareholders, in making their purchases, rely on
the recovery available to them under lOb-5 in the event they are defrauded); rather, the
theory is premised on the idea that the rule would lead to selecting a regulatory regime in
regards to all aspects of securities regulation, such as, for example, the disclosure and
reporting requirements, which more obviously correlate to a higher cost of securities for
investors. In addition, not all issuers engage in fraud, so the choice of the optimal level of
regulation by those who do not should not be affected by calculations of potential fraud
liability.
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optimal level of regulation. 14 1 If issuers choose to offer their securities on
exchanges where investors perceive they will not receive adequate
protection, investors will offer less for the securities than the issuer could
obtain on an exchange associated with more investor-friendly rules.
Conversely, under regimes where the marginal cost of additional regulations
would outweigh the marginal benefits of the higher price investors might be
willing to pay, issuers will not choose to sell there. 142
Elsewhere, I have noted three problems with the exchange-based rule
articulated above, as it relates to securities fraud regulation, that likewise are
applicable to the Supreme Court's transactional test. 143 I reiterate those
problems here: The first problem is that the approach ignores the
interconnectedness of the financial markets and the resulting interest of
governments in punishing fraud, regardless of who is directly harmed. Fraud
in one place can have a chilling effect on markets worldwide, and even
investors and markets not directly affected by a fraud can be harmed
indirectly by fraudulent activity elsewhere.' 44 This means that the U.S. and
other countries have a strong interest in deterring fraud, regardless of where
the effects are felt. Excluding foreign claimants from bringing suit in the
United States, or from participating in class actions in the United States that
are premised on the same underlying transaction in which the foreign
claimants were harmed, undermines the deterrent effect of the private cause
of action under Rule 1Ob-5. 145 The benefits of the private cause of action,
and the class action lawsuit in particular, are not available in most other
countries, which "'lack private procedural instruments which can generate
rigorous substantive control.' ' 146
A second problem with the market-based approach to fraud regulation is
that it ignores other factors influencing the choice of law (or here, the
selection of a market). This calls into question the underlying assumption of
the theory that "choice" will lead to a socially optimal level of regulation. In
141 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337-38 (1999).
142 Guzman, supra note 128, at 914.
143 See Beyea, supra note 128.
144 See IOSCO REPORT, supra note 131, at ii (noting that the concerns raised by
financial scandals involving large, publicly-traded companies are "truly global in
nature").
145 See Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a
Globalized Economy-Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class Action
Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1563, 1588 (2005).
14 6 Id. (quoting Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for
Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 217, 267-68
(1992)).
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practice there are many factors besides antifraud protections that dictate
where people invest and where issuers choose to sell their securities,
including tax considerations, expertise of regulators, reporting requirements,
and even simple geography. All other things being equal, the law and
economics approach to antifraud regulation might be a good one, but
unfortunately, all other things are not equal. 147 Therefore, market selection
may not in fact lead to the optimal level of antifraud protection. A market-
based approach may in fact lead to a regulatory "race to the bottom."'
148
Related to this is the law-and-economics assumption of the rational investor,
which holds that investors price the potential for fraud into the securities they
purchase. This assumption implies that if issuers choose a regime perceived
as not adequately deterring or punishing fraud, they will receive a lower price
for their shares, which will point issuers towards listing where strong anti-
fraud protection exists. However, the assumptions associated with the
rational investor model do not necessarily hold up under scrutiny. An
alternative model of investor behavior, the so-called "trusting investor"
model, 149 argues that investors "are willing to lose fair and square but not to
be taken by fraud."'150 After they are defrauded, investors lose trust in the
markets, leading to price declines and potentially prolonging a bear
market. 151 While it is unclear which view of investor behavior has been
empirically proven, there is at least some evidence that a significant number
of investors better fit the trusting investor model. 152 This evidence against the
rational investor model, combined with the potential for a regulatory race-to-
the-bottom, 153 both caution against letting the markets decide the appropriate
level of antifraud regulation.
Third, for the transaction-based approach articulated by the Supreme
Court to adequately protect defrauded U.S. investors, one must assume that
all other countries with a stock exchange have an adequate antifraud
147 See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEo L.J. 957,
959 (2002).
148 The race-to-the-bottom versus race-to-the-top debate has recurred throughout
corporate legal scholarship. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. & ECoN. 383, 384 & n. 1 (2003).
14 9 See Lynn A. Stout, The Ninth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: The
Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 407, 415-20 (2002).
150 Tamar Frankel, The Ninth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: Regulation
and Investors' Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 443 n. 17 (2002).
151 Stout, supra note 149, at 436.
152 See generally id.
153 See Fox, supra note 141, at 1394-95 (arguing against a market-based, issuer
choice regime in the context of disclosure regulations, due to the likelihood that issuers
will choose a regulatory regime with less-than-optimal disclosure requirements).
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enforcement regime. Such an assumption may be true in respect to some
countries but certainly not all of them. Even countries with advanced
financial systems such as Germany have recently been reexamining their
securities enforcement systems following large corporate scandals. 154 The
Securities and Exchange Commission has argued against the market-based
approach for this reason, fearing it would let too much fraud slip through the
cracks. 155 Of course, the reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision relied
primarily on the text of the statute, and therefore did not leave room for the
countervailing policy considerations that weigh in favor of a more flexible
rule than the one adopted by the Court in this case. However, the potential
impact of the Morrison decision may be ameliorated somewhat by actions
taken by Congress and the SEC. 156
C. Implications of the Court's Opinion on Specific Constituencies:
Dual- and Cross-Listed Companies and U.S. Investors Purchasing
Shares in Foreign Companies
Although the Court's vision as to the proper extraterritorial reach of the
securities laws is quite clear from Justice Scalia's opinion, upon closer
examination, the actual holding of the case raises a number of questions that
will bear on its application to future cases. The Court calls its new test a
transactional test. 157 The implication is that application of 10(b) will be
premised on the location of the transaction. However, the holding of the case
does not actually say that. Justice Scalia's test states simply that 10(b) applies
"only [to] transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and
domestic transactions in other securities."1 58 Does this mean Section 10(b)
will apply to all transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges,
regardless of where the transactions occur? As for the second prong, how
will courts define a "domestic transaction in other securities"? Answers to
these questions will have important direct impacts on a number of specific
constituencies, namely dual- and cross-listed companies, and U.S. residents
who invest directly in foreign companies.
154 See Astrid Stadler, A Test Case in Germany: 16,000 Private Investors vs.
Deutsche Telekom, 10 ERA FORUM 37, 37-48 (2009) (discussing recent German reforms
to its securities laws act aimed at coping with mass litigation in German courts).
155 SEC Brief, supra note 5, at 27-28.
156 See discussion infra Part V.A.
157 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
158 Id. at 2884.
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For cross-listed and dual-listed companies, 159 how the Court's holding is
interpreted will have important consequences for their future Section 10(b)
liability. Reading the holding in the context of the dicta in the rest of the
opinion, it certainly seems that the Court intended Section 10(b) to apply
only to domestic transactions in securities traded on a domestic exchange (or
other domestic transactions), but that transactions on a foreign exchange,
even if the same securities involved in such foreign transactions were also
listed on a U.S. exchange, would not be subject to Section 10(b). However, it
would have been very easy to write a holding that clearly stated such a rule.
The simple addition of the word "domestic" before the phrase "transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges"']60 would have accomplished this.
A number of amici also suggested alternative rules that would have
established a truly transactional test, 16 1 and commentators have been
articulating exchange-based tests for years. 162
A literal reading of the language of the holding implies that even if a
foreign company issues misleading statements overseas to primarily foreign
investors, if the stock about which the misleading statements were made is
also listed on a U.S. exchange, Section 10(b) will apply. The reference to
"securities listed on domestic exchanges" was repeated three times in the
opinion, 163 which logically implies that Justice Scalia meant what he said. In
addition, the opinion's emphasis on protecting domestic exchanges supports
this outcome, because if the securities are listed on a domestic exchange,
fraud related to a particular class of securities, no matter where the plaintiffs
in question purchased their securities, will have an effect on the price of
those securities on the domestic exchange. 164 The Exchange Act seems to
159 Cross-listed companies' shares trade primarily on a local exchange, but are also
traded in a secondary listing on an exchange in another country, generally in the form of
depositary receipts. (If the secondary listing is in the U.S., for example, these will be
American Depositary Receipts.) Dual-listed companies have their shares directly listed
on multiple stock exchanges.
160 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
161 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 31,
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) (arguing for a bright-line rule under which
Section 10(b) would only apply to securities bought or sold in the United States).
162 See, e.g., Choi & Silberman, supra note 41, at 492-93.
163 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2885, 2886. The formulation on page 2885 of the
opinion uses the term "national securities exchanges."
164 While it is indisputable that a "domestic effect" will occur in such a scenario,
because the price of the shares will generally fall on all exchanges upon which they are
traded, this alone will not necessarily give rise to a claim under Section 10(b) for foreign
plaintiffs who did not purchase their securities on a U.S. exchange. See Choi &
Silberman, supra note 41, at 476. Furthermore, U.S. courts have traditionally declined to
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implicitly recognize this in the portion of its preamble cited by the petitioners
as textual evidence of the Act's extraterritorial application.' 65 Though the
Court dismissed this argument, and while it is not the kind of clear statement
of extraterritorial application that would have been conclusive of Congress's
intent, it does recognize the U.S. interest expressed by the Second Circuit in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook166 when it held that Section 10(b) would apply to
"violations of the [Exchange Act] although the transactions which are alleged
to violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national securities
exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American investors. ' 167 This
expression of U.S. interest could support a literal reading of the first prong of
the Court's Morrison holding, that Section 10(b) will apply to a fraudulent
transaction whenever the stock at issue is listed on a national exchange.
The Court's application of the holding to the facts of Morrison also
supports this view. In concluding that the petitioners had failed to state a
claim, Justice Scalia wrote, "This case involves no securities listed on a
domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases complained of by those
petitioners ... occurred outside the United States." 168 Inclusion of the first
clause of this sentence implies that if the securities in question had been
listed on a domestic exchange, the outcome would have been different. If the
Court had intended a purely transactional test, it would have been sufficient
to state only that "the purchases ... occurred outside the United States."
However, this reading of the Court's decision presents a problem on the
facts of the case: National Australia Bank had American Depositary Receipts
(ADRs) 169 trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Not all ADRs traded in
apply Section 10(b) to foreign plaintiffs on the basis of such an argument under the
effects test. These courts have held that, even though the same foreign conduct may have
caused harm to U.S. resident holders of a company's securities (e.g., in the form of
ADRs) and to foreign purchasers of the securities, jurisdiction does not extend to the
foreign plaintiffs' claims under the effects test (though the U.S. purchasers would have a
claim under Section 10(b) on the basis of the effects test). See, e.g., In re Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 & n.16 (D.D.C. 2000).
165 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 95, at 39 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2006)).
166 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
167 ld. at 208 (citations omitted).
168 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
169 "The ADR, similar in form to a standard U.S. registered stock certificate, is a
substitute trading certificate evidencing the ADSs that represent the underlying shares of
the foreign corporation." CLEARY GOTrLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, GUIDE TO PUBLIC
ADR OFFERINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Apr. 15, 2007) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ADR
OFFERINGS], http://www.cgsh.com/nl-
NUguide to-public adr-offeringsin the unitedstates/. "ADSs" are American
Depositary Shares. See id. at 1.
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the United States are also "listed" on an exchange, 170 but the Court's own
opinion states that NAB's ADRs were "listed on the New York Stock
Exchange." 171 Either the Court overlooked this, or it did not understand the
relevance of this fact. If a company lists ADRs on a national stock exchange,
the ADRs (representing American Depositary Shares, or ADSs) must be
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section
12(b) of the Exchange Act,172 and the registration process typically involves
the registration of two securities: the underlying shares and the ADSs
themselves. 173 In addition, ordinary shares underlying the listed ADRs are
technically also listed on the exchange. 174 This renders inaccurate the Court's
statement that the securities at issue in Morrison were not registered on a
domestic exchange, since technically the NAB common stock underlying the
170 There are three "levels" of American Depositary Receipt programs. Levels 2 and
3 ADRs are listed on a domestic exchange, whereas Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-
counter. Id. at 9 n.23. One recent post-Morrison district court opinion declined to apply
Rule lob-5 to the claims of U.S. purchasers of Level 1 ADRs in U.S. over-the-counter
transactions. In re Socintd Grn~rale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL
3910286, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). However, this holding itself is questionable for
a number of reasons. First of all, the court's opinion evinces a poor understanding of
transactions in ADRs. These transactions are a way in which foreign issuers can avail
themselves of the U.S. markets, but the transactions, whether over-the-counter or on a
market, clearly take place in the United States. Traditionally, issuers of ADRs in the U.S.
understood that they may be subject to lOb-5 liability. See Establishing a Level I
American Depositary Receipt Program, NORTON ROSE LLP (July 2009),
http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2009/pub22176.aspx?page=0907231
71010&lang=en-gb. Secondly, the court in Socigt Gnrale relied on a misplaced quote
from another case, In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, where the court in
dicta that was specific to the facts of that case stated, "Assuming that the purchase of...
ADSs on the NYSE and the purchase of... shares by U.S. residents on the [Swiss Stock
Exchange] may be viewed as predominantly foreign securities transactions ... ." 537 F.
Supp. 2d 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (footnote omitted). On the basis of this quote, taken
out of context, the judge in Socidtg G nrale asserted that "[t]rade in ADRs is considered
to be a predominantly foreign securities transaction." 2010 WL 3910286, at *4 (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the second prong of the Supreme
Court's holding in Morrison, there is no reason to believe that Section 10(b) should not
apply to purchases by U.S. persons of Level 1 ADRs which are sold in over-the-counter
transactions in the United States.
171 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
172 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (2006).
173 GUIDE TO ADR OFFERINGS, supra note 169, at 9.
174 Vivendi III, No. 02 Civ. 05571(RJH)(HBJ), 2011 WL 590915, at *7 n.13
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011).
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ADRs was listed on the NYSE.175 A number of recent district court opinions
addressing the application of Section 10(b) to transactions in ADRs show a
failure to understand the nature of ADR programs, barring the claims of U.S.
plaintiffs who purchased the ADRs of foreign-listed companies in the United
States.' 76 This failure to grasp the fact that Levels 2 and 3 ADRs are in fact
listed on U.S. exchanges may also have been the Supreme Court's problem
in rendering its opinion in Morrison, or it could have been a simple mistake
in drafting the opinion so that it is less clear in stating a transactional test
than the Court intended. 177
How other courts interpret the Morrison holding in light of the foregoing
will have a significant bearing on the outcome of a number of transnational
securities fraud cases currently going forward in U.S. courts. The In re
Vivendi Universal securities litigation has been progressing through U.S.
courts since 2002,178 following the issuance of material misrepresentations
about the French company's severe cash crisis in the wake of some high-
profile acquisitions in the U.S. and Canada. 179 In October 2009, the case
actually went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in February 2010
finding the company liable for misleading investors. 180 Following the jury
verdict, it was estimated that the claims against Vivendi could total as much
175 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1 (2010). The court also used the terms "listed" and
"registered" interchangeably, see, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885, though there is a
technical difference in the meaning of the terms.
176 See, e.g., In re Socitt6 Gtntrale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL
3910286, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
177 It is also possible that the Supreme Court intended to bar the claims of plaintiffs
who had purchased U.S.-listed ADRs in the United States; however, this would be a
somewhat radical result, as ADRs (at least Levels 2 and 3 programs) heretofore have
clearly been covered by U.S. securities laws. See, e.g., International Investing, U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2011) ("When you buy and sell ADRs you are trading in the U.S. market."). This would
appear to be a re-writing of the securities laws, if it is in fact what the Supreme Court
intended. The more likely explanation for the lower court decisions is that lower courts
are simply misconstruing Morrison in applying it to dismiss the claims of U.S. purchasers
who bought ADRs in the United States.
178 See Vivendi II, No. 02 Civ. 557 1l(RJH), 2004 WL 2375830, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
22, 2004).
179 See VivendiI, 381 F. Supp. 2d 158, 166-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
180 Grant McCool, Vivendi Faces Damages, to Appeal Jury Verdict, REUTERS (Jan.
29, 2010, 3:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60S5VU20100129.
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as four billion dollars.' 81 However, Vivendi appealed the verdict on the basis
of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.182 Attorneys for the Vivendi
shareholders argued that because at least some of Vivendi's ordinary shares
and its ADRs-the two classes of shares covered by the jury verdict-were
listed on the NYSE, and because the ordinary shares were registered with the
SEC pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, Morrison should not
affect the foreign plaintiffs' ability to proceed in the case.1 83 However, in
ruling on the appeal, the court found that the plaintiffs' argument failed on a
technicality: "registration with the SEC is not the same as listing (registering)
on an exchange," the court noted. 184 Furthermore,
[t]he sample NYSE listing application provided to the Court at argument
indicates that only a discrete number of ordinary shares are listed; this being
the number of ordinary shares needed to back-up the ADRs being listed.
Thus while all ordinary shares of a foreign issuer are deemed to be
registered with the SEC, a lesser fixed amount of shares are actually listed
with the Exchange. And ordinary shares that are not listed on an exchange
(for any purpose) would fall outside plaintiffs' literalist reading of the
Morrison bright-line test as well as the underlying language of Section
10(b). 185
This decision in the Vivendi litigation thus limits recovery to plaintiffs
(both domestic and foreign) who actually purchased ADRs on the NYSE,
and excludes the claims of plaintiffs who purchased ordinary shares of
Vivendi Universal on foreign exchanges. This is a reasonable reading of the
Morrison decision, and a considerable improvement on other post-Morrison
district court decisions such as In re Socit6 G~nrae.186 However, it now
leaves a significant group of foreign Vivendi investors without a remedy. In
181 1d; but see Vivendi Liable, supra note 48 ("[T]he potential payout could total
$9.3 billion."). Following Judge Holwell's 2011 decision narrowing the class of
claimants to only certain purchasers of the ADRs, the total amount of liability will be
significantly reduced. See Vivendi Universal, S.A.: American Depositary Receipts,
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/1024N02-0l/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (noting that the
decision eliminates more than eighty percent of the potential damages in the case).
182 See Vivendi III, No. 02 Civ. 05571(RJH)(HBJ), 2011 WL 590915, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011).
183 Id; see also Jonathan Stempel, Vivendi Argues for Dismissal of a Jury Verdict,
REUTERS (July 26, 2010, 1:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/26/us-
vivendi-hearing-idUSTRE66P4SF20100726.
184 Vivendifl, 2011 WL 590915, at *8.
185 Id.
186 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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addition to the Vivendi litigation, the outcomes of a number of cases filed by
British Petroleum shareholders against that company in relation to alleged
misrepresentations about the Deepwater Horizon rig could also be affected
by the Morrison decision.
The outcomes of those cases will have an important impact for cross-
listed companies with ADRs trading in the United States. This is no small
matter, as ADRs are currently the most common way that foreign companies
list and offer equity securities in the United States. 187 These cases may also
affect dual-listed companies that list the same class of their common stock on
both a U.S. and a foreign exchange, which face a similar fact pattern to cross-
listed companies in the context of their Section 10(b) liability. While dual-
listed companies are clearly subject to Section 10(b) liability with respect to
material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the securities
listed on a U.S. exchange, an expansive interpretation of the first prong of the
Supreme Court's holding in Morrison could expand the scope of their
liability to include foreign investors who purchased securities abroad. A
literal reading of the holding raises this possibility. However, such foreign
plaintiffs' claims would not have survived under the old effects test absent
significant domestic conduct that would fulfill the conduct test,188 and
Morrison clearly narrowed the extraterritorial application of the securities
laws from the previous state of affairs under the old conduct and effects tests.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that courts will interpret the Morrison holding
this way. However, until subsequent court decisions clarify this, cross-listed
and dual-listed companies cannot yet breathe a sigh of relief.
Though the facts of Morrison only implicated the conduct test, the
Supreme Court's new "transactional test" also reaches factual situations that
previously would have been dealt with under the Second Circuit's effects
test. Therefore, a third constituency that will be directly impacted by the
Court's holding in Morrison is U.S. investors who purchase shares overseas.
This includes, for example, U.S.-based mutual or pension funds that purchase
shares directly on foreign exchanges, but in the modem era this could also be
a relatively unsophisticated U.S. investor who purchases shares in a foreign
company online from his local coffee shop through the services of an online
brokerage firm. Prior to Morrison, it was well-settled law that American
purchasers of a foreign company's shares could bring claims under Rule
10b-5.189 The first prong of the Supreme Court's holding now clearly bars
such an investor from raising 1Ob-5 claims so long as the particular shares
187 GUIDE TO ADR OFFERINGS, supra note 169, at 2.
188 Choi & Silberman, supra note 41, at 476.
189 See Vivendi III, 2011 WL 590915, at *9 (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank,
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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are not also listed on a domestic exchange. Whether or not such an investor
could raise a claim under the second prong of the test, which refers to
"domestic transactions in other securities," is less clear.
The most obvious scenario to which the second prong applies is, for
example, transactions carried out under Regulation D, whereby a foreign
issuer carries out a private placement in the United States. Securities sold in
this manner are exempt from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the
Securities Act and are not listed on an exchange, 190 but presumably the issuer
would still be subject to Rule 1Ob-5 liability as these are clearly considered
domestic transactions. 191 Whether or not it applies to investors who purchase
shares directly on foreign exchanges (whether through a broker or otherwise)
will most likely be determined by subsequent judicial decisions.
At least two post-Morrison decisions by a lower court suggest that the
answer is still no. In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group,192 U.S. resident
plaintiffs who had purchased shares of defendant Credit Suisse directly on
the Swiss Stock Exchange asserted that Morrison did not prevent them from
maintaining their Section 10(b) claims.' 93 The district court resoundingly
rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating, "This Court is not convinced that
the Supreme Court designed Morrison to be squeezed, as in spandex, only
into the factual strait jacket of its holding."'194 Reading the Supreme Court
case as a whole, the district court found the opinion indicated "that the Court
considered that under its new test Section 10(b) would not extend to foreign
securities trades executed on foreign exchanges even if purchased or sold by
American investors." 195 Similarly, in the most recent opinion in the Vivendi
litigation, Judge Holwell held that American purchasers of Vivendi ordinary
shares on a foreign exchange could not bring claims under Section 10(b). 196
This reading of the Morrison decision is not surprising, and probably sets the
trend that will be followed by lower courts in ruling on claims brought by
U.S. plaintiffs who purchased shares on foreign exchanges.
190 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (2010).
191 Stephen Choi, Assessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: Evidence on the
Decision to Sell Securities Outside the United States 3 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr.
for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 253, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=267506.
192 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
193 Id. at 621-22. The claims of a number of investors who had purchased Credit
Suisse ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange were not addressed in the opinion and
presumably are still live claims.
194 Id. at 625.
195 Id. at 625-26.
196 Vivendi III, No. 02 Civ. 05571(RJH)(HBJ), 2011 WL 590915, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2011).
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Assuming that courts construe Morrison as the Cornwell and Vivendi
courts did, Morrison will have the effect of narrowing the effects test to
exclude U.S. investors who purchased their shares on foreign exchanges.
This could potentially make domestic investors more wary of trading in
foreign securities, since the protections of Section 10(b) may no longer be
available to them. However, this may have the indirect benefit of
encouraging foreign countries to improve their own antifraud regulations in
the hopes of encouraging U.S. investors to invest in their markets.
V. CONGRESSIONAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO MORRISON
A. The Dodd-Frank Act
Even before the Supreme Court began its consideration of Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, Congress was already working to respond to the
expected outcome. 197 A bill passed the House of Representatives in
December 2009 that was intended to codify the Second Circuit's test for
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b). 198 A revised version of these
provisions, articulating the same test as the earlier House bill, but limiting its
application to actions brought by the Commission only, was adopted by the
whole Congress with passage of the Dodd-Frank Act less than a month after
the Court's decision in Morrison.199 The Act also ordered the Commission to
conduct a study to determine whether the same test for extraterritorial
application should also extend to private rights of action.200 However,
because the language of the Act was drafted prior to the decision (and
apparently without consideration of the Solicitor General's amicus brief in
the Morrison litigation), the Act may not actually have any effect, due to the
Court's correction of the Second Circuit's "threshold error" in Morrison.
As discussed in Part II.D. of this Article, courts have traditionally
addressed the question of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws
as a question of subject matter jurisdiction. In accordance with this, the
language of the Dodd-Frank Act states that U.S. district courts "shall have
jurisdiction" over claims arising under the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act whenever there is "(1) conduct within the United States that
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has
197 Dodd-Frank Act, H.R. 4173, 111 th Cong. § 7216 (2009).
198 Id. § 7216(b).
199 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010).
200 Id. § 929Y.
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a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States."'201 A number of
recent Supreme Court cases preceding Morrison had chastised the lower
courts for their "less than meticulous" treatment of the distinction between an
element of a claim for relief under federal law and a limitation on subject
matter jurisdiction.20 2 In recognition of this, the Solicitor General in her
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Morrison case pointed out the
problem and urged that the Court should treat the question of extraterritorial
application as a question of a plaintiff's entitlement to relief under the
relevant provisions of the Exchange Act.20 3 However, though the Solicitor
General's brief was submitted before the House passed its version of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the drafters of the bill either did not take note of the point
or were unaware of its significance for the language of the Act. In its opinion
in Morrison, the Supreme Court did correct this "threshold error" in the
Second Circuit's approach to extraterritorial application of Section 10(b),
effectively rendering moot the language of the Dodd-Frank Act, since the
federal courts already have jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Exchange
Act.204
While Congress's intent in including this language was clearly to
preserve the conduct and effects tests, the language of the Act as drafted does
not actually do so. The Supreme Court in Morrison acknowledged that
federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over such cases, but held that
Section 10(b) would not apply to transactions that did not meet its test.20 5
Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act may not have any effect on the application of
Section 10(b), depending on the willingness of courts to overlook the plain
language of the statute, even if this language is the result of a simple drafting
error. In light of this, and because Section 929Y of the Act instructs the SEC
to commission a study on extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) in
private rights of action, further pronouncements from Congress and the
Commission may be forthcoming. Though the Commission sided with the
Morrison respondents in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the case, it
had cautioned against too severe a restriction on extraterritorial application of
Section 10(b). 20 6 The Commission, therefore, is more likely than not to
201 Id. § 929P(c).
202 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
203 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 99, at 9.
204 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (2006)).
20 51 d. at 2877.
206 See id. at 2882.
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respond to its mandate from Congress in favor of a more flexible test for
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) in private rights of action.
B. Possible Securities and Exchange Commission Responses to
Morrison v. National Australia Bank
The Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison practically invites the
Commission to begin a round of rulemaking under Section 30(b) of the
Exchange Act. In determining that the presumption against extraterritoriality
should apply to claims arising under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the
Court focused on the language of Section 30(b) of the Act. Section 30(b)
"specifies that the [Exchange] Act does not apply to 'any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States,' unless he does so in violation of regulations promulgated by the
Commission 'to prevent evasion [of the Act]. '207 The Court interpreted this
to mean that foreign transactions were not within the scope of the Exchange
Act, "absent regulations by the Commission. '"208
This opens up the door for the Commission, should it so opt, to draft
regulations extending the scope of the Act to some foreign transactions. Of
course, such regulations would have to be within the mandate given to the
Commission by Congress, and thus limited to regulations the Commission
deems necessary to "prevent the evasion of [the Exchange Act]. 209 What
exactly such regulations would look like is not clear, since the Commission
has never taken advantage of this provision. However, the Court's opinion
provides some guidance, stating that "[t]he provision seems to us directed at
actions abroad that might conceal a domestic violation, or might cause what
would otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a technicality. ' 210 The
Commission could thus draft a regulation that would make the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act apply, for example, to the purchase by a U.S.
citizen, through a Canadian brokerage house, of securities listed only on the
Toronto Stock Exchange, where the defendant had only minimal contacts
with the United States.211 Whether or not the SEC will choose to go down
this route remains to be seen.
207 Id. at 2885 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006)).
208 Id.
209 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2006).
210 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
211 See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also Martin E.
Goldman & Joseph L. Magrino, Jr., Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation:
Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA.
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An additional step that should be taken by the Commission is a
clarification of the nature of American Depositary Receipt programs. At the
very least, the Commission should address this issue in its report to
Congress, given the recent erroneous decisions by district courts, applying
Morrison to dismiss the claims of U.S. plaintiffs who have purchased ADRs
of foreign companies on a U.S. exchange.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
represents a significant departure from courts' longstanding approach to
deciding when the securities laws apply in cases involving transnational
securities fraud. In articulating a new transactional test, the Court takes
another step towards "render[ing] the private cause of action under § 10(b)
toothless,"2 12 arguably the most important anti-fraud provision in the U.S.
securities laws. This carries important implications for regulation of
securities fraud, at least in the short term, increasing the potential that more
transnational securities fraud will go unpunished, and possibly also under-
deterring such fraud. It also leaves a number of questions as to its application
for plaintiffs who purchase shares in companies with American Depositary
Receipts listed on U.S. markets or in dual-listed companies. The outcome of
a number of major transnational securities fraud cases currently in U.S.
district courts will depend on answers to these questions. In the longer term,
the opinion invites reaction from both Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, either in the form of a clear pronouncement from
Congress about the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws, or in the form
of new regulations from the Commission that could close some loopholes for
companies that commit fraud affecting U.S. markets or investors but
structure their transactions in such a way as to avoid application of U.S.
law.213 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress did attempt to make a clear
pronouncement that, at least where enforcement actions brought by the
Commission are concerned, Section 10(b) may still be applied
extraterritorially under the old tests articulated by the Second Circuit.214 Less
than meticulous drafting of the Act, however, raises the specter that lower
L. REv. 1015, 1027 (1969) (noting that the factual situation in Kook was considered
exactly the type of situation for which Section 30(b) had been enacted to address).
212 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
213 See supra Part V.
214 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P.
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courts will decline to interpret the Dodd-Frank Act as having any real effect
on the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison expresses skepticism over the
benefits of private litigation in aid of enforcement of the securities laws.
However, limiting the private right of action may do more harm than good at
a time when investor confidence is already on shaky ground in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis. While issuers will generally applaud the decision
because it provides increased certainty and limits their exposure to the U.S.
securities antifraud provisions, it has been viewed as a step backwards by
those who advocate for shareholder interests. 215 However, while the decision
may let more fraud slip through the cracks, in the best-case scenario it may
also provide a catalyst for securities fraud enforcement reform in other
countries, and for better cross-border cooperation in enforcement.
215 See Greene, supra note 122.
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